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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DALE L. LARSON; GRETHE LARSON; 
and SYSTEMATIC BUILDERS, INC*, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
OVERLAND THRIFT AND LOAN; LINDA 
D. MILNE; and WESTERN SURETY 
COMPANY, 
Defendants and Appelleees. 
Case No. 900411-CA 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Appellants herein herewith make and file their 
petition for rehearing pursuant to Rule 35, Utah R. App. P., 
and following state with particularity the points of law 
and fact the court has overlooked or misapprehended in its 
opinion filed October 17, 1991. 
INTRODUCTION 
The present controversy involves the efforts of 
defendant Overland to recover allowable damages for breach of 
an equipment lease. According to the agreement of the parties, 
payments required to be made under the lease agreement were 
secured not only by the equipment described in the lease but 
also purportedly by the residence of plaintiffs Larson through 
a trust deed irregularly executed by Grethe Larson who affixed 
her own signature to the trust deed as well as that of her 
husband Dale. 
Because Overland commenced its recovery efforts by 
non-judicial foreclosure procedures against the trust deed the 
parties are reversed from that usually encountered because it 
became necessary for plaintiffs to institute this action to 
have their rights and liabilities under the lease agreement and 
trust deed declared and determined, and if fraud be found, for 
rescission and damages. As the Court's decision recites, Overland i 
an assignee of the lease agreement and beneficiary in the trust deec 
Plaintiffs properly demanded trial by jury of all issues. 
(Because the issues here involved the determination of the right 
to the possession of plaintiffs1 residence they were entitled to 
jury trial on all issues of fact relating thereto. Holland v. 
Wilson, 8 Ut2d 11, 327 P.2d 150 (1958); Hansen v. Stewart, Utah 
Supreme Court Opinion filed July 28, 1988 #19383.) 
Overland1s right to recovery is limited by the pro-
visions of the lease agreement that allow for the recovery of 
damages upon default of the lessee(s). If the lease agreement 
provides for liquidated damages, which is the case here, and 
the amount of liquidated damages is disproportionate to the 
possible compensatory damages (full contract [lease] price, less 
the current value of the equipment, and the time value of the 
payments), and constitutes a forfeiture or penalty, then defend-
ant Overland may not recover. Young Elec. Sign v. United 
Standard West, 755 P.2d 162 (Utah 1988). 
Plaintiffs claim fraud in the inducement on the part 
of agents of Overland"s assignor and consequently Overland. 
It is plaintiffs claim that defendant Milne as agent and employee 
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participated in the fraud by falsely notarizing the trust deed 
and seeing to its recordation. 
As the Court recites in its decision, Overland purchased 
Larsons1 residence for $51,864.90 at non-judicial foreclosure 
sale with full knowledge that Larsons were claiming the under-
lying trust deed was obtained through fraud and was otherwise 
irregular (forged by one of the purported signers). Overland 
thereafter did nothing to undo the sale or to adjust its 
position relative to the plaintiffs1 claims. In fact, Overland 
sought and was granted summary judgment that "the execution of 
a Deed of Trust [the deed of trust] by Grethe Larson describing 
the Residence was valid, binding, and enforceable as a matter 
of law, and that it further created a severance of the joint 
tenancy of Dale L. Larson and Grethe Larson in the Residence. 
Pursuant to such transfer of interest by Grethe Larson and the 
subsequent foreclosure of the Deed of Trust by Overland, the 
Court orders that the present interests of Overland and Dale 
L. Larson in and to the Residence are that of tenants in common, 
each owning an individual one-half (1/2) interest therein; . . .' 
thereby confirming purchase by Overland for $51,864.90 at fore-
closure sale. This would seem to conflict with the Court's 
analysis of the facts that ". . .the real property was sold to 
Overland for $51,864.90" and "the [district] court . . . 
ordered the transfer of Grethe Larson's one-half interest in 
the Larsons' home to Overland." 
Although without a legal determination of whether 
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due or not, under anyone's interpretation of the record, 
Larsons are entitled to have $51,864.90 credited against 
any obligations under the lease agreement purportedly owing 
at the time of the sale. Using Overland's summary judgment 
proof (Affidavit of K. Douglas Anderson, r. 961-65) as a 
guide as to the amount owing on May 27, 1987 under the rule 
of damages (benefit of the bargain) stated above, there would 
be nothing due Overland on the lease after the application of 
$51,864.90. Overland having purchased and paid $51,876.90 for 
the property securing the lease agreement there was no further 
obligation thereunder for plaintiffs, or either of them, to pay 
anything. Overland, having elected to proceed as it did (non-
judicial foreclosure) is bound by the results; and in that it 
sought no deficiency in the manner prescribed by statute (§57-1-32) 
cannot subvert the intent of that procedure by proceeding on a 
cause of action under the lease and guaranty agreement against 
plaintiff Dale Larson that does not exist. It is this theory of 
double recovery that plaintiffs espoused throughout these pro-
ceedings in the trial and appellate courts, and not, as the 
Court suggests "enforcement of the lease allowed double recovery 
and penalty because Overland only sought to recover amounts due 
after offset from sale proceeds." 
All of the foregoing facts and inferences were properly 
before the trial court at the time of the summary judgments; each 
presents the issue of whether Overland (and Milne and her surety) 
were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
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The rule in Colonial Leasing [731 P.2d 483] applies 
here. Where certain lease provisions, e.g., those quoted 
in fn. 2 of the Court's decision, are the same or similar to 
provisions normally contained in security or sale agreements, 
an ambiguity is created concerning the intentions of the 
parties that can only be cleared up by extrinsic evidence 
which has been denied by the Court's decision in this case. 
In summary judgment proceedings it is for the proponent to 
establish the non-existence of factual issues, and that he 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In this record 
whether the lease agreement is a true lease or a security 
agreement remains a question because ambiguities exist as 
to the intentions of the parties that can only be resolved 
by a jury. 
In its decision the Court holds that because of pro-
cedureal default appellants will not be permitted to 
challenge in this appeal the award of attorney's fees in 
the judgment against defendant Dale Larson. The sanction 
serves purely a technical interest; and again it is the 
case that in challenges to summary judgments it is for the 
proponent to establish that such judgment would be proper 
because no questions of material fact remain and movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The record itself, 
devoid of showing of legal justification and professional 
reasonableness for the fee award, leaves questions of fact 
remaining as to the legal justification and professional 
reasonableness for the fee award. 
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In its decision the Court did not address the penalty 
or forefeiture issue as it is presented by appellants. Againf 
it was Overland1s duty in its summary judgment motion to establish 
that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In the 
trial and appellate courts appellants have contended that Overland 
did not establish its right to judgment under the liquidated 
damages provision of the lease agreement because it would result 
in a penalty or forfeiture. A penalty results for two reasons; 
first, in determining the amount of recovery there is no credit 
given the lessee for the current market value of the leased 
equipment; and, second, the lessor is allowed "a sum equal to 
one-third of the monthly payments that would have been paid if 
the lease had continued in full force and effect for [60 months], 
without consideration of the shortening of the term by reason of 
default." The provision is therefore unenforceable as a penalty, 
Young Elec. Sign, supra, because the amount of liquidated 
damages agreed to is disproportionate to the possible compensatory 
damages. 
CONCLUSION 
At the entry of summary judgments herein, 
1. A question of material fact remained as to whether, 
or to what extent, the obligations under the lease agreement had 
been discharged at the time of Overland1s counterclaim. 
2. A question of material fact remained as to what 
obligations $51,864.90 paid. 
3. A question of material fact remained as to whether 
the lease agreement was a true lease or a sale agreement. 
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4. A question of material fact remained as to 
whether there was a commercially reasonable disposition 
of the leased equipment after default and repossession. 
5. Overland had not established its right to judgment 
as a matter of law under the liquidated damages provision, 
6. A question of material fact remains as to whether 
plaintiff was damaged by the fraudulent actions of the notary 
public. 
WHEREFORE, appellants cerify that this petition is 
presented in good faith and not for delay, and pray that the 
same be in all things granted. 
DATED November 4, 1991. 
<^r-l(l\A?7^-
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